Top

blog

Stories

 

Bush Declares Victory!

White House releases beta version of Iraq 5.0.

After five long years, the United States has finally secured victory in the War on Terror, George W. Bush declared today.

I'm as surprised as you are. This is what the president said this morning at the Pentagon:

"The surge has done more than turn the situation in Iraq around — it has opened the door to a major strategic victory in the broader war on terror."

The announcement comes 5.0 years after the U.S. invasion of Iraq and 4.9 years after Bush declared, "Mission accomplished!"

In this morning's speech, Bush also said:

"In Iraq, we are witnessing the first large-scale Arab uprising against Osama Bin Laden. And the significance of this development cannot be overstated."

The BBC's report on the speech notes:

Meanwhile in Iraq, a female suicide bomber killed six people at a bus station in Balad Ruz in Diyala province, according to Iraqi police.

And near the northern city of Kirkuk, US troops shot dead three Iraqi policemen by mistake, an incident officials described as "a tragic accident, which was sincerely regretted".

Don't let that spoil your celebration.

Diplomat: 'U.S. Had No Post-Conflict Plan'

Latest appraisal of Iraq debacle comes from an unlikely source: the magazine for mercenaries.

barney-fife-bremerNU399.jpg

Our deputy in Iraq: If the Iraq Army hadn't been disbanded in 2003 by Jerry Bremer (above), military officials tell Charles Ferguson, "we could have nipped this insurgency in the bud."

The latest piece of evidence that the Bush regime bungled post-invasion Iraq — and one of the first bits we've read from a high official that it likewise bungled Afghanistan's "reconstruction" — comes from the unlikeliest source: the trade journal for mercenaries like Blackwater.

Career diplomat Robert Pearson, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey during the Iraq invasion, treats the re-destruction of Iraq as a given — merely background for his article about how the mercenary industry can pitch in to help around the world.

Quite unintentionally, what Pearson says dovetails neatly with Charles Ferguson's response to preposterous pasha Jerry Bremer's op-ed about who didn't do what in the early stages of the Iraq disaster. (All you need see is Ferguson's journalistically groundbreaking video letter to the editor, "The Debacle of Disbanding the Iraqi Army - 9/14/07." )

If Bremer and the White House hadn't disbanded the Iraq Army, there wouldn't have been as much chaos, and "private security contractors" from companies like Blackwater wouldn't have invaded Iraq in such numbers. There are an estimated 129,000 private contractors of all types in Iraq, almost as many as the number of U.S. soldiers before the "surge" began last January.

Pearson matter-of-factly writes, on page 11 of the September/October issue of the super-jingoistic and wonderfully named Journal of International Peace Operations:

In 2003, global attention focused on U.S. stabilization roles in two key fragile states. In Iraq, it was apparent that the U.S. had no post-conflict plan ready to implement. [Emphasis added.] The civil administration began with a quarrel between Washington and General Jay Garner, the dismissal of Garner, and the arrival of Paul Bremer to head the CPA.

In Afghanistan, NATO began operations in Kabul, its first ever deployment outside Europe. While the move was applauded, in reality it was a coalition of the willing inside NATO, as the U.S. and its allies made individual decisions about the effort. Clearly, the U.S. was entering onto a new phase of experimentation in managing international crises, despite its long experience in dealing with such challenges.

What a mess! In this magazine that features a full-page ad for Blackwater — the main U.S. mercenary company and the one now being driven out of Iraq — Pearson, an ally of Colin Powell's, notes that serious planning for post-invasion Iraq began in the fall of 2003.

Yes, that's six months after the U.S. invaded.

Even then, the White House refused to go along. Oh, at first, SecDef Don Rumsfeld did. But the regime refused to fund State's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS, as it was known):

Secretary Powell wanted a contingency fund of about $200 million to allow S/CRS to react promptly with all its assets in case of need. Senators Richard Lugar (R-Indiana) and Joseph Biden (D-Delaware) strongly supported this fund, but the U.S. Office of Management and Budget repeatedly refused to include the request in the Administration budget. In the end, the Administration was content to live with the promise rather than the reality of a truly serious international reconstruction effort led by the U.S.

Wait. It gets worse. At least we had this S/CRS in place. But while Iraq and Afghanistan veered quickly into chaos, S/CRS had to fight to find some fighting elsewhere to fight. Pearson writes:

This shortfall forced S/CRS from the beginning to fight for both personnel and operating resources, limiting its intended purpose and focusing it on short-term survival tactics.

Looking for a reason to prove its worth, S/CRS became involved in rebuilding efforts in Haiti and then in Sudan at the Department’s direction.

These moves, though worthy on their merits, still detracted from the office’s original aims and roused the jealousy of USAID, now fearing that S/CRS might be intended to be a State Department ploy to replace USAID’s core mission. The commitment to training, gaming and overall widespread preparation for responding to overseas emergencies on a serious scale suffered badly. The result was a loss of focus on S/CRS’s original scope and purpose.

This episode also illustrates the struggle between Powell and Rumsfeld over the Bush-Cheney regime's "war on terror." It was a battle that Powell continually lost.

By the way, if you're interested in becoming a mercenary, especially now that Blackwater has been kicked out of Iraq and there's nobody left to guard Ambassador Ryan Crocker and U.S. officials have been forbidden to leave Baghdad's Green Zone, be sure to attend the "annual summit" of the International Peace Operations Association on October 28-30 in D.C.

Dreadlock in Baghdad

Sunday in Iraq

IBC

Here's a question, raised in 1979 by the mellifluous Mighty Diamonds:

Who's gonna bodyguard ya, Mr. Bodyguard?
I want to know who.

Thirty years later, the answer's clear: The Pentagon, that's who. At best we'll get the "rogue security contractor" excuse from the Bush regime for Sunday's cacophonous killing of 11 Iraqis in Baghdad by the North Carolina mercenary army Blackwater.

That excuse has worked before. As I wrote in July 2004, it was used by the Pentagon after the Abu Ghraib tortures came to light. SecDef Don Rumsfeld blamed "rogue" soldiers.

Our memories are short when it comes to the mercenaries employed by the Bush regime. As I pointed out in August 2004, private "interrogators" from CACI were employed by the Pentagon at Abu Ghraib, where all that "fear up" went down.

After this latest incident of privatized violence, we have Blackwater saying its boys were ambushed. Blackwater has 1,000 "troops" in Iraq and guards Ambassador Ryan Crocker. Yes, they guard Crocker, and the administration guards them. Monday's Washington Post concisely captured the two versions of the latest Blackwater escapade. Here's the first:

The shooting started at noon on Sunday when a car bomb exploded near a State Department motorcade traveling through the western Mansour neighborhood of Baghdad near Nisoor Square, U.S. officials said. Following the explosion, Blackwater employees guarding the diplomats exchanged fire with armed attackers, Blackwater and U.S. officials said.

The subsequent battle killed at least nine people and wounded 14, Iraqi police and hospital workers said. [An Iraqi official] put the death toll at 11.

Followed by the second version:

"We were shocked when we saw these fighters getting out of their SUVs and shooting randomly at people," said Sgt. Mohammed Juwad Hussein, an Iraqi army soldier who said he was manning a checkpoint in Baghdad near the scene of the fighting. "We didn't know who they were targeting or who they wanted to shoot."

They wanted to shoot them some Ay-rabs, pal. The way I see it, the Mighty Diamonds sang about the possibility of dreadlocked Rastafarians someday making bodyguards pay the price:

One of these days it a go dread (dreader than dread)
Ev'ryone looking a place to hide 'em head (well dread)

But don't worry, Blackwater bodyguards, the Bush regime will shelter you. Iraq's citizens are the ones who can't hide. As of this morning, IBC's "documented civilian deaths from violence" totals somewhere between 72,596 and 79,187.

Yes, the Blackwater "incident" was notable. But as the IBC "recent events" list notes, on that same Sunday, many other Iraqis died, and not at the hands of American mercenaries, whom our press continues to euphemistically label "contractors" or "bodyguards."

One of the victims was a 12-year-old boy who was killed in Diwaniya during a raid by U.S. and Iraqi troops, according to news reports assembled by IBC. Wonder what happened there?

In any case, this particular bloody Sunday was predestined. IBC's list of 38 people who were killed just the day before includes this entry:

Baghdad: car bomb kills 11 outside bakery, Amil; 11 bodies.

And this one:

Karma: 3 bodies.

Pullout Plan? Big Wheels Just Keep Spinning.

New reports on Iraq confirm previous reports. Further reports coming. The best report, by Larry Korb, goes unreported.

cheney-coffin-final399.jpg

Cheney's current plan for pulling troops out of Iraq.

While we're waiting for the Petraeus report — which will be written by the White House, as previously buried in an L.A. Times story — the press is playing up a new report to Congress that says the Iraqi national police force (its army, kind of) won't be ready to handle the chaos until later this century.

But that's old news. The freshest report wasn't commissioned by Congress or the White House or the Pentagon. And it didn't have anything to do with the Senate Democrats trying to "reframe" the "Iraq debate," as the New York Times put it in a detailed story yesterday about that irrelevant bluster.

The most dynamic and relevant report comes from Larry Korb, a high-ranking Defense official under Ronald Reagan, and it's going unreported. Now a senior fellow at the progressive think tank Center for American Progress, Korb released on August 27 an actual plan for pulling out of Iraq. Read "How to Redeploy: Implementing a Responsible Drawdown of U.S. Forces from Iraq" or listen to Korb talk about it, or do both.

More than a week after its release by the mainstream and highly visible think tank, Korb's report hasn't even hit the news pages and has gotten only a little play on op-ed pages. But it's detailed and realistic, compared with all the other pullout plans — of which there are none, except for the Bush-Cheney regime's current strategy, pictured above.

Seriously, Korb's plan is pretty damn good reading, and it comes from someone who's no flaming liberal pinko. But, then, veteran Iraq watcher Tony Cordesman's reports have been consistently ignored since before the 2003 invasion.

Here's what Korb's report says:

It is time to stop recklessly extending our military presence in Iraq and regain control of our national security by redeploying our forces out of Iraq in an orderly and safe manner.

Yet there remains significant disagreement and confusion concerning the time necessary to withdraw all U.S. military forces from Iraq. The debate has gravitated back and forth between those arguing that there must be either a rapid, precipitous withdrawal or a long, drawn-out redeployment. Further clouding the issue are those who support an extended redeployment over several years simply in order to "stay the course" in Iraq, and as a result cherry-pick logistical issues to make the case for an extended U.S. presence.

Deciding between a swift or extended redeployment, however, is a false dilemma. While both options are logistically feasible, this report will demonstrate that an orderly and safe withdrawal is best achieved over a 10- to 12-month period. Written in consultation with military planners and logistics experts, this report is not intended to serve as a playbook for our military planners but rather as a guide to policymakers and the general public about what is realistically achievable. A massive, yet safe and orderly redeployment of U.S. forces, equipment, and support personnel is surely daunting — but it is well within the exceptional logistical capabilities of the U.S. military. …

A phased military redeployment from Iraq over the next 10 to 12 months would begin extracting U.S. troops from Iraq's internal conflicts immediately and would be completed by the end of 2008.

That's nice, but how do we do it?

The most effective strategy for removing American troops from Iraq involves gradually withdrawing troops from the outer geographic sectors of Iraq first, with the goal of reducing our military footprint and consolidating our presence before our final departure.

A phased consolidation approach would resemble a slower and more deliberate approach than an "invasion in reverse." Units would move using a combination of their own ground transportation and intratheater air support. The American military footprint would shrink from the outside to the center, starting first with withdrawal from the most northern bases — excluding the 3rd Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division and the 3rd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne, which would redeploy from around Kirkuk and Tikrit north of Baghad to Iraq's Kurdish region to support a temporary U.S. commitment to resolve outstanding Turkish-Kurd issues. The remaining units would then redeploy from the rest of northern Iraq followed by Diyala to the west and Anbar province to the east. Our forces would then be consolidated in Baghdad, from which they would withdraw until all American forces — save a temporary residual presence in Iraq's Kurdish region — would eventually be gone (see map on page 5).

And not only maps. Korb and his collaborators lay out a detailed month-by-month schedule, division and brigade by division and brigade — which equipment to leave and which to take with us, and doing it all with the least danger to our troops and to the Iraqis who haven't already fled their country.

Now that's a report worth reading. Meanwhile, we're deluged in the press with old news and report upon report upon report that say the same things and don't offer solutions, except to "disband" or "start over." Too late for that talk. Stuck in a bad place, our big wheels are spinning and not getting us or our troops anywhere.

Treating the latest of such reports as fresh, the Washington Post puts it this way this morning.

Iraq's army, despite measurable progress, will be unable to take over internal security from U.S. forces in the next 12 to 18 months and "cannot yet meaningfully contribute to denying terrorists safe haven," according to a report on the Iraqi security forces published today.

The report, prepared by a commission of retired senior U.S. military officers, describes the 25,000-member Iraqi national police force and the Interior Ministry, which controls it, as riddled with sectarianism and corruption. The ministry, it says, is "dysfunctional" and is "a ministry in name only." The commission recommended that the national police force be disbanded.

Yes, but the New York Times broke that very report last week, saying:

An independent commission established by Congress to assess Iraq's security forces will recommend remaking the 26,000-member national police force to purge it of corrupt officers and Shiite militants suspected of complicity in sectarian killings, administration and military officials said Thursday.

The Times played the breakdown of the police as a scoop, and the rest of the media followed right along. But that, too, was mostly old news.

Yet another report, way back on June 7, made the same points, as was reported at the time — or, rather, underreported.

That June report was, and is, readily available from the Pentagon. Check it out yourself (PDF). Its details are devastating, especially for a document just sitting there on the Pentagon website. For instance:

Militia infiltration of local police remains a significant problem. Prime Minister Maliki has expressed a commitment to retraining and reforming police units that are shown to be serving sectarian or parochial interests. Some security forces also remain prone to intimidation by, or collusion with, criminal gangs.

Even when police are not affiliated with a militia or organized crime, there is often mutual distrust between the police and the judiciary, each viewing the other as corrupt.

Corruption? Oh, brother. The details reported three months ago were staggering:

Corruption, illegal activity and sectarian/ militia influence constrain faster progress in developing MoI [Iraq's Ministry of Interior, in effect its Pentagon] forces and gaining Iraqi populace support. Although the primary concern of the GoI [Government of Iraq] remains the ongoing insurgency, multiple allegations of tolerance of and influence exerted by Shi'a militia members within the MoI is troubling. Militia influence impacts every component of the MoI, particularly in Baghdad and several other key cities. The MoI also continues to struggle with internal corruption, and the ministry made continued efforts this quarter to address this problem. Key to these efforts is effective investigations when allegations appear to have some credibility. For example:

From January 1, 2007, through March 31, 2007, MoI Internal Affairs opened 1,954 new corruption-related investigations. The investigations resulted in the firing of 854 employees, the forced retirement of 13, referral to the Commission of Public Integrity of 16 for further investigation, and internal disciplinary action against 255. The other 816 cases remain open. The Internal Affairs Directorate conducted 41 human rights-related investigations. Of these, two resulted in disciplinary punishment and 39 remain open. …

And who knows how many instances have gone unreported and haven't been investigated? That's because even the investigators are deathly afraid:

The current security environment restricts the movement of criminal investigators (predominately Shi'a) in the MoI from traveling to crime scenes around Baghdad and other key cities to conduct investigations.

But the Pentagon's June report went relatively unnoticed, maybe because of how it ended:

Conclusion
The Iraqi police and military forces continued to grow this quarter in fulfillment of the Prime Minister's initiative. The ministries made some progress in developing capacity to manage these forces, in particular in taking ownership of basic training. Continued efforts will be required to build the capacity of the forces and the ministries to sustain themselves without Coalition support and to operate independently without the full range of Coalition combat enablers.

With such a bland summary of explosive facts, further fact-finding was clearly needed. You'd think enough facts have been found. But do we really need to point out that it's always safer for politicians to either "reframe debates" or commission their own studies and reports than to listen to people like Korb and Cordesman and then hammer out hard decisions?

Paper Trails in Iraq

Times blows the Bremer-Bush dustup story. Rumsfeld, Cheney roles ignored in 2003 blunder.

The New York Times pulled out of Iraq coverage even before the war started when it sent in Judy Miller to beat the WMD war drums.

But five years later, it still hasn't re-entered the battle, judging by its inept handling of the Bush-Bremer dustup over who was responsible for disbanding the Iraq Army back in 2003.

Ignoring explosive material published a year ago in the British press and played up practically everywhere in the world but in the major American papers, the Times downplayed SecDef Donald Rumsfeld's role in the tragic blunder of dismantling the army and police, and the paper didn't even mention Dick Cheney.

Over the weekend, Robert Draper, peddling his book Dead Certain, said Bush had been taken aback by the tragic decision announced by Bush regime czar Jerry Bremer to disband Iraq's army in the spring of 2003.

That was in a September 2 Times story by Jim Rutenberg, who apparently hadn't talked to Bremer about Bush's comments. (Rutenberg's story was just a hack job titled "In Book, Bush Peeks Ahead to His Legacy.") Bremer rushed over to the Times and dropped off a bundle of letters that, he claims, show that Bush knew of the plan and liked what Bremer was doing.

Here's how Times reporter Edmund L. Andrews handled the gift from Bremer in the September 4 story:

A previously undisclosed exchange of letters shows that President Bush was told in advance by his top Iraq envoy in May 2003 of a plan to "dissolve Saddam's military and intelligence structures," a plan that the envoy, L. Paul Bremer, said referred to dismantling the Iraqi Army.

Mr. Bremer provided the letters to The New York Times on Monday after reading that Mr. Bush was quoted in a new book as saying that American policy had been "to keep the army intact" but that it "didn't happen."

The dismantling of the Iraqi Army in the aftermath of the American invasion is now widely regarded as a mistake that stoked rebellion among hundreds of thousands of former Iraqi soldiers and made it more difficult to reduce sectarian bloodshed and attacks by insurgents. In releasing the letters, Mr. Bremer said he wanted to refute the suggestion in Mr. Bush's comment that Mr. Bremer had acted to disband the army without the knowledge and concurrence of the White House.

The Andrews story makes it sound as if Bremer was briefing Rumsfeld about this plan, that the plan was something that Bush and Bremer were hammering out. Nothing could be further from the truth.

In October 2006, David Blunkett, Britain's Home Secretary during the crucial pre-invasion and immediate post-invasion period, told all in an interview with the Guardian (U.K.) and the serialization of his diaries from that time. Unlike Bremer's book published earlier this year, Blunkett was candid about his screw-ups and about what he did — and didn't do. More importantly, he reveals just who was making the big decisions for the U.S. Here's a hint: It wasn't Bremer and it wasn't Bush. From the Guardian story by Patrick Wintour and Julian Glover:

A member of the war cabinet, [Blunkett] reveals that Britain battled with the US vice-president, Dick Cheney, and defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, not to press ahead with dismantling "the whole of the security, policing, administrative and local government system on the basis of the de-Ba'athification of Iraq.

"The issue was: 'What the hell do you do about it?' All we could do as a nation of 60 million off the coast of mainland Europe was to seek to influence the most powerful nation in the world. We did seek to influence them, but we were not in charge, so you cannot say that if only the government recognised what needed to be done, it would all have been different. The government did recognise the problem."

He admits: "We dismantled the structure of a functioning state," adding that the British view was: "Change them by all means, decapitate them even, but very quickly get the arms and legs moving."

This 2006 story wasn't totally ignored in the U.S. press. The Washington Monthly's Kevin Drum summed it up well on October 8, 2006:

DE-BAATHIFICATION....Former British Home Secretary David Blunkett, whose diary will begin serialization in the Guardian on Monday, says that it wasn't Paul Bremer who favored dismantling the Iraqi military after the invasion. …

I don't suppose this is really surprising news or anything — did we ever really think Bremer made this decision on his own? — but it's nice to see confirmation. Yet another disastrous miscalculation from the dynamic duo of Cheney and Rumsfeld. Have these guys ever gotten anything right?

Drum's right. It wasn't surprising in 2003 that the decision was being made by Rumsfeld and Cheney, not Bremer, and it certainly wasn't surprising in 2006. So why was the Times story so clueless?

This isn't the first time Times reporter Andrews has mishandled a big story. Back in 2004, Andrews blew a vital news angle about corporate tax breaks. Read my October 12, 2004, post, in which I wrote:

Regarding the corporate tax bill, the Times's Andrews naively writes that George W. Bush "has indicated he will sign the measure despite White House concerns that it is overloaded with special-interest provisions." That's malarkey about White House "concerns." The Bush regime, which includes leaders of the GOP-controlled Congress, knew that senators of both parties would waddle over to the trough and slurp up the bill's "surplus" so they could excrete it as a steaming pile of pork-barrel projects. The structure of this session's two major tax bills is all part of the White House's shrewd strategy to reward corporations at our expense.

If you want something beyond my immature screed, read this October 2004 measured analysis of the corporate tax cuts, courtesy of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities' Joel Friedman.

Regarding the Bremer-Bush dustup and the blunder of dismantling the Iraq Army, the New Yorker's George Packer parses it and takes the long view. Packer also shrewdly notes that it's not wise to give the Bush regime too much credit for being orderly enough to make decisions. Bush's White House and Pentagon were, and are, a dysfunctional family. Writing about the blunder of dismantling the Iraq Army, Packer notes:

No one has ever been able to explain the history of that crucial decision, which countless Iraqis have told me was the biggest mistake of the American occupation and a huge factor in the growth of the insurgency. When I was researching The Assassins' Gate I learned that, just before Bremer went to Iraq, in early May, 2003, he had discussed the issue at the Pentagon with Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, and Walt Slocombe (who became Bremer's adviser on Iraqi security forces in Baghdad), and then he cleared the decision with Donald Rumsfeld. This account was later borne out in Bremer's book. Did Condi Rice know? Dick Cheney? Bush himself? It's been impossible to be sure, and a former Administration official once told me that this fact alone shows what a dysfunctional policymaking process it was.

A history-changing decision, upending a previous policy, was made on the fly by a handful of officials at the Pentagon who consulted with no one else in Washington, let alone in Iraq. (In The Assassins' Gate, I describe the disbelief of a U.S. Army colonel, Paul Hughes, who at the time was knee-deep in the effort to organize and pay soldiers of the defeated Iraqi army; his outrage is the high point of the powerful new film No End in Sight.) Bremer's letter to Bush proves that the President was told at the last minute and gave the O.K. — but that's it. He had nothing to do with the decision either way and seemed barely aware of it.

Meanwhile, the exchange between the two of them — which took place when Iraq was already slipping away — reminds me of Lear talking to his fawning daughters at the opening of the play. "As I have moved around, there has been an almost universal expression of thanks to the US and to you in particular for freeing Iraq from Saddam's tyranny," Bremer assures his boss. "The dissolution of his chosen instrument of political domination, the Baath Party, has been very well received." The President answers in kind: "Your leadership is apparent. You have quickly made a positive and significant impact. You have my full support and confidence."

Unless hard drives are destroyed and archives sealed, one day we'll be able to read thousands more such documents of the war. The details will be damning.

Good News: Bush Regime Helps Iraqis Unify

nu-kid-sign-carfire399.jpg

Harkavy

There's good news from fractured, chaotic Iraq: Thanks to the U.S., Iraqi factions are putting aside their tribal and political differences and are pledging unity to save their country.

If you read only U.S. newspapers and watch U.S. TV, you probably missed this fascinating development.

Not that this is a triumph of U.S. diplomacy. The factions are those that have launched thousands of deadly attacks on American soldiers and Iraqi police, and they're unifying only to drive the U.S. occupiers out of their country.

You might have heard Colin Powell say July 18 on NPR that the U.S. cannot maintain its current level of American-soldier fodder in Iraq beyond mid-2008. Powell lied in February 2003 about WMD in Iraq, but he's probably not lying now. NPR's intro noted:

Some time ago, Powell apologized for presenting an inaccurate case to the United Nations on Iraqi weapons.

Powell does not support Congressional efforts to bring the troops home. But he tells [correspondent] Robert Siegel in an interview on Wednesday that troops will have to start coming home next year, because the military is stretched too thin.

But the bigger news — practically ignored by U.S. media — was from Seaumas Milne of the Guardian (U.K.), who wrote July 19 from Damascus:

Seven important Sunni-led insurgent groups fighting the US occupation in Iraq have agreed to form a public political alliance to prepare for negotiations in advance of a US withdrawal.

In their first interview with the Western media since the US-led invasion of 2003, leaders of three of the insurgent groups — responsible for thousands of attacks against US and Iraqi armed forces and police — said they would continue their armed resistance until all foreign troops were withdrawn from Iraq.

They also denounced al-Qaeda for sectarian killings and suicide bombings against civilians.

But just because these rebels are announcing a political alliance doesn't mean that it's a peaceful one. Milne's story continues:

Abu Ahmad, spokesman for Iraqi Hamas, said: "Peaceful resistance will not end the occupation. The US made clear it intended to stay for many decades. Now it is a common view in the resistance that they will start to withdraw within a year."

The move represents a dramatic change of strategy for the mainstream Iraqi insurgency, whose leadership has remained shadowy and has largely restricted communication with the world to brief statements on the internet and Arabic media.

The last three months have been the bloodiest for US forces, with 331 deaths and 2,029 wounded, as the 28,000-strong "surge" in troop numbers exposes them to more attacks.

It's only smart for the Sunni rebel groups to try to position themselves now for what inevitably will be peace talks — to the chagrin of the Bush regime — between the insurgents and U.S. officials (forget the Iraqi "government, which has little control over the country). And it's smart for them to try to distance their own violence against Shi'ites (and U.S. soldiers) from other rebels' bombings of civilians (and U.S. soldiers).

This new Sunni alliance does increase the pressure on George W. Bush's regime to start pulling out — as Bush's father should have done 61 years and nine months ago.

But withdrawing from Iraq is too big a decision to leave to the president. What does Dick Cheney think? He told a cluster of Boys State delegates in Wyoming last month:

I think it's very important that we not walk away from Iraq.

No problem. A number of our soldiers will continue to arrive home in coffins.

In Fallujah, Hysteria Repeats Itself

falluja-air-strike-victim39.jpg

Blast the beasts and children: An Iraqi surgeon sews up a young victim of U.S. air strikes on Fallujah in 2004.

While the big dailies tear themselves away from the Israeli-Palestinian death dance to focus this morning on another U.S. "surge" against Iraqi rebels in Diyala province northeast of Baghdad, the residents of Fallujah, west in the desert, are once again being squeezed to death.

We bombed the hell out of Fallujah in April 2004 and again that fall. The next year, we found out, thanks to Human Rights Watch, that Camp Mercury, outside the desert city, was home to our self-described "Murderous Maniacs," who routinely tortured Iraqi civilians for amusement — our soldiers called it "fucking" them. We bombed a hospital to rubble and refused admittance to aid workers. Exactly two years ago, Fallujah was such a madhouse of destruction that Americans were fighting with Americans.

Guess what? We're doing it again to Fallujah. This war has gone on so long that the tragedies are being re-enacted in full. And the Pentagon is spinning this latest Fallujah tragedy of increased chaos and misery into yet another fairy tale of "stabilization."

If you want to measure our progress in Iraq, just keep an eye on Fallujah, where hysteria keeps repeating itself. With such a pattern, no wonder our own hospitals are overloaded with stressed-out, freaked-out, mentally ill U.S. soldiers.

Things could always be worse, and they are if you live in Fallujah. The U.N. news service IRIN reports this morning:

A month-long security crackdown is preventing aid workers from getting to displaced families in the central Iraqi city of Fallujah and its outskirts, while a curfew imposed by US forces is restricting residents’ ability to go out and buy much-needed supplies.

"We are living like prisoners, lacking assistance at all levels. Aid support, which last year was always here, can’t be seen any more. We depend solely on ourselves, drinking dirty water to survive, even knowing that our children are getting sick from it," said Muhammad Aydan, 42, a resident of Fallujah, some 70km west of the capital, Baghdad.

Water? Forget about it. Electricity? Only if you have your own generators and fuel. IRIN continues:

Local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) said they had been denied entry to Fallujah by the Iraqi and US military as a security crackdown in the area, which started on 21 May, could put their lives at risk. The NGOs have called upon security forces to help in the delivery of aid to families who are in dire need of assistance.

"We have supplies but it is impossible to reach the families. They are afraid to leave their homes to look for food and children are getting sick with diarrhea caused by the dirty water they are drinking. We have information that pregnant women are delivering their babies at home as the curfew is preventing them from reaching hospital," Fatah Ahmed, spokesman for the Iraq Aid Association (IAA), said.

"[What is happening in Fallujah] is a crime against the right to live. Such behavior is seen by locals as a punishment for recent attacks on US troops, but innocent civilians are the only ones who are paying," Ahmed added.

Oh, yeah? Here's how the Pentagon's permanently embedded reporter Tim Kilbride of the American Forces News Service spins it, writing only five days ago:

Expanded cooperation with the Iraqi police and army and the introduction of provincial security forces are helping stabilize Fallujah, Iraq, and the surrounding areas, a coalition commander said yesterday.

In fact, we're even winning the Iraqis' hearts and minds, according to Marine Col. Richard Simcock, commander of Regimental Combat Team 6:

U.S. cooperation with the [Iraqi] police is beginning to manifest in a neighborhood-by-neighborhood approach in Fallujah, Simcock said. He called this approach "a district-type plan."

He explained, "We'll go into certain districts and establish neighborhood watches, … and we're finding that to be very, very successful."

"Success" is in fact the key word in this "district-type plan." The Pentagon propaganda continues:

The success of the joint fight against insurgents in Fallujah is driving the enemy to increasingly target the Iraqi security forces instead of U.S. troops, Simcock noted. Their weapons of choice, he said, are improvised explosive devices and suicide-vest bombs.

One reason for the shift in targets, the colonel explained, is that the insurgents "see that the tide is changing, that the support of the Iraqi people [is] coming over to the coalition force side."

Except from those who are still alive.

Law and Order: Iraq Victims Unit

iraq-blood-spigot-al-sabah2.jpgIt's bad enough that the Pentagon's just-released report on Iraq contains some frightening news — some of it quite blunt — for U.S. soldiers and their families. But a closer look reveals some even worse news on the semantic front. In other words, the War Department tried like hell to put a smiley face on things but just couldn't. That means the situation is really bad.

The bottom line is that George W. Bush announced a "New Way Forward" on January 10 — the regime must have borrowed the name from Mao — and a "surge" of U.S. troops, officially named Operation Fardh al-Qanoon (Enforcing the Law, or Law and Order), was launched on February 14. The fardh is something of a farce. Known by its acronym of FAQ (someone has a sense of humor, even if it's unintentional), the surge was supposed to start quelling the violence in Baghdead. Instead, the number of attacks overall has risen and has spread from Baghdad to places like Diyala province.

Since the surge began, the percentage of attacks against the U.S. has declined slightly, but the percentage of attacks against civilians and Iraqi army and cops has increased. The overwhelming majority of attacks, as always, are aimed at American soldiers, proving once again that the only thing that unifies Iraqis who have guns and bombs is that they want us the hell out of their country.

The report's language, though, is the point. The report is titled "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq." What it measures is instability and insecurity.

A key chapter is titled "National Reconciliation." What it measures is the increasing number of schisms, concluding that "some analysts see a growing fragmentation of Iraq."

"Some analysts"? That's a handy device used by the Pentagon to try to distance itself from its own conclusions. Reporters use that technique when asking tough questions without directly making the accusations themselves so that the conversation doesn't get too personal and the person being questioned will keep talking — "Some people say you did indeed take $10,000 in bribes, Congressman Phil N. DeBlank, and that the money, they say, was in small bills stuffed into a brown envelope."

Anyway, the report's section titled "Political Commitments" is about the lack thereof:

An important element of the New Way Forward is that Iraqis take the lead in devising their own strategy and commit to significant political, economic, and security steps. Reaching consensus among a wide array of political factions with competing agendas has proven difficult, and efforts to pass this legislation are progressing more slowly than desired.

And the section titled "De-Ba'athification Reform" is actually about re-Ba'athification: the long-overdue strategy of re-admitting into the government bureaucracy people who were lesser members of Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party — many people had to join Saddam's party to get government jobs, just as people on Long Island had to join the Nassau County GOP (until recently, the nation's most powerful local political machine) if they wanted jobs. The Bush regime and its preposterous pasha, Jerry Bremer, swept everyone out of the army and government in 2003, a move that since has been called the U.S.'s gravest miscalculation of the entire Iraq debacle.

Digression: Way back on May 14, 2003, when Bremer disbanded the Iraqi army, the San Francisco Chronicle's Robert Collier wrote:

U.S. officials said they will not pay past or current salaries of the former army, secret police and presidential guard. The move essentially disbands those forces — but does not provide any formal means of disarming the ex-combatants.

Good move, Jerry. You earned your Medal of Freedom then and there. (See "Full Medal Jackoffs," December 15, 2004.)

Back to the current Pentagon report. On the re-Ba'athification, it notes:

Strong resistance to the return of Ba'athist officials persists, particularly in Kurdish areas and among Shi'a leaders, despite provisions in the draft law intended to exclude former officials believed to be culpable for human rights abuses.

Reforms could be delayed by months, and high-profile attacks by Sunni insurgents and extremists could continue to exacerbate Shi'a fears of a Ba'athist resurgence.

To be fair, the report's section titled "Government Reform" is about something that hasn't yet happened:

Strong democratic institutions that impartially serve all Iraqis, foster conditions for national reconciliation, and transcend regional, sectarian and tribal divisions remain critical to Iraq's success. Recognizing the poor performance of some ministries, Prime Minister Maliki promised to reform his government to fight corruption, reduce sectarianism, and improve the provision of essential services to all Iraqis.

And finally, the section titled "Rule of Law" shows that there isn't much:

In the past two and a half years, 24 judges have been assassinated. Some judges decline to try cases related to terrorism or the insurgency because of intimidation and security concerns. As a result, in some provinces very few serious criminal cases result in convictions.

One thing, however, that the surge has done is increase the number of people arrested:

As a result of FAQ, the number of persons held in detention in March and April was nearly 20% higher than the monthly average for December through February. Consequently, the U.S. is working with the Iraqi government to increase short-term detention capacity by constructing facilities that will hold an additional 6,000 beds by mid-September 2007. In addition, detainee abuse is a problem in Iraqi pre-trial detention facilities run by both MoI and MoD.

"Beds"? Those are prison-cell beds. At last, some good news: We're building more prisons. That's something the U.S. knows about: We have the highest prison population rate in the world.

The report says the U.S. has vowed to show the Iraqis how to run their prisons. The report doesn't say who we're sending them to do that. Hopefully it's not Lynndie England.

Dome and Doomer

First the dome, then the minarets. The news today from Iraq is even more grim than usual.

The terrorist bombing this morning of a sacred shrine in Samarra comes on the heels of a really grim assessment by an American general of how many more centuries we'll be in Iraq.

It was only last month that a U.S. Marine blogging smartly from Iraq as Licari of Arabia wrote about the February 2006 terrorist bombing of the Golden Dome — the Al Askari shrine in Samarra, north of Baghdad — as a "sentinel event." Licari explained that the "psychological damage to Iraq's Shia population was stunning." Riots and more bloodshed ensued after that bombing.

So what's going to happen after this morning's bombing of the shrine's minarets? As the BBC reports:

The two minarets of the al-Askari shrine in Iraq, one of the holiest sites in Shia Islam, have been destroyed by two explosions.

According to witnesses the minarets collapsed completely after being hit by bomb blasts at around 0900 (0500 GMT).

The shrine houses one of two tombs in Samarra for revered Shia imams.

The 2006 bombing of the shrine's dome is widely believed to have set off a continuing spiral of sectarian violence in which many thousands have died.

The BBC's Jim Muir in Baghdad says there are obvious fears this latest attack might give it yet further impetus. . . .

Almost immediately after the explosions, a curfew was imposed on Samarra as Iraqi security forces and US troops rushed to the area.

At least this time, we didn't directly do the damage. Back in 2004, we dropped a 500-pound bomb on a Fallujah mosque, pulverizing both of its minarets. "Yes, good, destroy a mosque and create another 10,000 jihadists," I wrote at the time.

Today's bombing will roil Iraq even more, and remember: It was only yesterday that Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey painted one of the grimmest assessments yet of our agonizing entanglement in the Iraq debacle. As the Washington Post reported this morning:

A senior U.S. military commander said yesterday that Iraq's army must expand its rolls by at least 20,000 more soldiers than Washington had anticipated, to help free U.S. troops from conducting daily patrols, checkpoints and other critical yet dangerous missions.

Even then, Iraq will remain incapable of taking full responsibility for its security for many years — five years in the case of protecting its airspace — and will require a long-term military relationship with the United States, said Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey, who until recently led the U.S. military's training effort in Iraq.

Dempsey laced his sober analysis with a morsel of erudition:

Describing the U.S. effort in Iraq as a labor of Sisyphus, he said the metaphoric stone is "probably rolling back a bit right now in Baghdad. But I don't think it's going to roll over us."

Sisyphus was a scumbag leader who was punished for his trickery by being forced to roll a huge boulder up a hill. Each time he did so, the boulder would escape his grasp and roll all the way back down. So he would have to do it again and again. Forever.

Maybe I credited Dempsey with too much savvy. Yes, the boulder may not roll over us, but we're going to keep trying to push it up the hill again and again. And we'll inevitably fail.

In this modern-day tragedy, the boulder is crushing Iraqis each time it rolls down the hill. And who's being punished by having to do the damn pushing? Not our scumbag leaders but American soldiers.

It probably all sounds like Greek to our Congress. It certainly did back in October 2002 when they paraded lemming-like behind the Bush regime over the cliff and down into Iraq.

Iraq Blows Up Without Explosives

While Iraqi government chaos increases, Rumsfeld lies to Congress about 'progress' of 'political process'

al-mutamar-july19-no871.jpg


In this July 19 cartoon in Baghdad's Al-Mutamar, an Iraqi citizen sleeps with daggers in his back, representing "various conspiracies against the innocent Iraqis."

Amid the stifling heat, the prickly rash of a hated occupation by foreign soldiers, and the outbreak of car bombings by terrorists, frustrated Iraqis are blowing up their own government.

That's odd: Don Rumsfeld's propaganda machine doesn't mention that this morning. Instead, the Defense Department proclaims:

    Terrorists in Iraq have been unable to derail the political process, a new Defense Department report on Iraqi stability and security states. Still, the report contends, insurgents "remain capable, adaptable, and intent on carrying out attacks."

    The report to Congress on measuring stability and security in Iraq says the inability of insurgents to derail political progress is a "noteworthy strategic indicator of progress toward a stable security environment."

Is this some sort of sick joke? The "report" is nothing more than the latest Weekly Status Report—the same vague charts—that the U.S. government has been pumping out for months, only this time accompanied by more bullshit.

I've written plenty about these weekly reports—at first produced by Defense and now by State—how they've become less and less informative as the situation in Iraq has gotten worse and worse, how they constantly overstate the number of Iraqi cops and soldiers.

This latest version, transmogrified by Rumsfeld into "good news," doesn't even mention that the total number of "trained" troops includes those who have gone AWOL.

Compare page 12 of this new Rumsfeld report with page 6 of the July 6 State Department Weekly Status Report and you'll see what I mean: It's the same chart, with the "soldiers" and "cops" columns reversed. The numbers are very similar but slightly different, which is odd, because each chart says the data are as of July 4.

Of course, only the State Department version includes the footnotes about the figures being padded by the AWOL troops. Below are the charts I'm talking about. Sorry they're so small, but I'm hemmed in by the layout. Click on each to get the PDF files.

defense-dept-7-21-page12.jpg

Defense Dept., July 21

Above, the chart from page 12 of the latest Defense Department report. Below, page 6 of the weekly State Department report. Both charts (click on each to go directly to their PDF originals so you can actually see them) are as of July 4, so why are the figures different? And see the two crucial footnotes on the State Department page? They're missing from the Defense Department page.

state-dept-7-6.jpg

State Dept., July 6

I guess Rumsfeld figures that Congress is too stupid and lazy to compare the two charts and realize that he and his staff are—in addition to twisting, massaging, and omitting—just making up this shit as they go along. I guess he's probably right.

Besides the lies, what the Bush regime is neglecting to tell you is that the political process in Iraq is blowing up without the direct aid of explosives.

Just a couple of days ago, the Baghdad provincial council unanimously decided to fire the city's governor, Alaa al-Tamimi, accusing him "of being incapable of dealing with his responsibilities," says the daily Al-Adala (brought to us by the intrepid Ali Kadhim Marzook in the Baghdad bureau of the Institute for War & Peace Reporting). The IWPR's summary continues:

    The council also said he is not firm in dealing with his staff, which resulted in bad services for the people and corruption. The council added that he is always out of Iraq and relies on people who are not competent to run his office. They accused him of corruption, saying he used 13 billion Iraqi dinars a month as salaries for the office of guards and security, but no one knows where this office is.

Digression: George W. Bush was right: We really are building a Western-style democracy there. Al-Tamimi would be right at home in the Nassau County GOP, Al D'Amato's old machine, which plundered one of the nation's richest counties and left its citizenry with outrageously high taxes and poor services. (Full disclosure: That includes me.) Alaa al-Tamimi. Al D'Amato. They even sound the same. End of digression.

You careful readers of Iraqi politics, please note: Alaa al-Tamimi is not to be confused with Alwan al-Tamimi, deputy leader of the Diyala provincial council, who was blown up for real on June 2 in Baquba. A car bomb killed the latter al-Tamimi and three of his bodyguards as their convoy drove past.

Bodyguards aren't safe even when their boss isn't around: Earlier that day, the bodyguards of Deputy Prime Minister Ruz Nuri Shawis were eating in a Baghdad restaurant when it exploded. The bomb not only destroyed the place but also set eight cars on fire. Shawis wasn't there, because he travels by air. Of his guards, who traveled by car, one of them was killed and six others injured.

It's becoming increasingly difficult to figure out who's getting blown up, who's getting kicked out, who's doing what. Maybe that's because, as the daily Al-Sabah reports, Iraq's Ministry of Information has been dissolved.

Well, at least the courts are functioning. After all, Saddam Hussein is about to go on trial, right?

But the legal office of the Council of Ministers, according to the daily paper Baghdad, has decided to get rid of the court system's director general, security director, and seven judges of the criminal court. That's because they had contact with the dissolved Baath regime. Twelve to 17 more judges face ouster for the same reason.

That shouldn't stop Saddam's supposedly upcoming trial. Only the hell that is Iraq itself could do that. His lawyer Giovanni di Stefano—at least di Stefano claims to be one of Saddam's lawyers—wants a change of venue for obvious reasons, telling the Associated Press the other day:

    "Do you fancy spending a year or more in Baghdad, going to court five days a week? Would you feel safe there?

    "Baghdad couldn't even prevent the recent kidnapping and killing of the Egyptian ambassador. There are also many Iraqis who want to see Saddam executed and many others who want to see him freed. That means the defense and prosecution would both be in danger there."
Sign up for free stuff, news info & more!

Tools

404: page not found
404
The page you are looking for has either moved or never existed.
Try going home and start from there.

Links

Browse Voice Nation
  • Voice Places

    Voice Places

    Discover restaurants, nightlife, travel, shopping...

  • VOICE Daily Deals

    VOICE Daily Deals

    Get 50 to 90% off every day on restaurants, movies, massages...

  • Best Of

    Best Of...

    More than 10,000 of the BEST things to eat, drink, and experience

  • My Voice Nation

    My Voice Nation

    Join the Village Voice community and get exclusive deals and info

  • Happy Hour

    Happy Hour

    Your local Happy Hour guide at your fingertips

or

Log in or Sign up

Social Connect:

Use your favorite account to access My Voice Nation.


Use your My Voice Nation account to log in:





Forgot password?
or

Sign Up or Log in

Social Connect:

Sign up for My Voice Nation with your preferred network.


Sign up for a My Voice Nation account:



Privacy policy